This paper develops a theoretical model that relates changes in educational inequality to the combined effects of innovations that have increased the relative demand for more educated labor and innovations that have increased ability premiums. Under the assumption that in the long run individual decisions to become more educated equalize the lifetime earnings of more educated workers and comparable less educated workers, our model yields two novel implications: First, given the existence of ability premiums, innovations in the relative demand for more educated labor increase educational inequality in the short run, but, ceteris paribus, would induce large enough increases in the supply of more educated labor to decrease educational inequality in the long run. Second, in the long run innovations that increase ability premiums, by causing the supply of more educated workers to be smaller than otherwise, cause educational inequality to be larger than otherwise. In applying our theory to recent changes in educational inequality in the United States, we suggest that increases in ability premiums have dampened the long-run response of the relative supply of more educated workers that otherwise would reverse previous increases in educational inequality.
In recent decades labor markets in the United States have witnessed increases in both educational inequality and in ability premiums. This paper develops a theoretical model that suggests that these phenomena are related. The analysis is especially concerned with the prospects for a reversal of recent increases in educational inequality and for a return to a secular trend of decreasing educational inequality.
In the short run, because the relative supply of more educated labor is given, innovations that increase the relative demand for more educated labor increase educational inequality.
In contrast, in the long run educational inequality depends on both the relative demand for more educated labor and the relative supply of more educated labor, as determined by the fraction of workers that chooses to become more educated. The main new idea developed in our analysis is that the relative supply of more educated workers increases in response both to innovations that increase the relative demand for more educated labor and to innovations that increase ability premiums.
To model this educational response and its effect, we assume that in the long run individual decisions to become more educated equalize the lifetime earnings of more educated workers and comparable less educated workers. Given this assumption, we Þnd that in the long run, if ability premiums exist, then innovations that increase the relative demand for more educated labor by themselves would induce large enough increases in the supply of more educated labor to decrease educational inequality. But, most interestingly, our analysis also implies that innovations that increase ability premiums cause a smaller fraction of workers to choose to become more educated. As a result, in the long run increases in ability premiums cause educational inequality to be larger than otherwise. To the extent that increases in ability premiums are contributing to educational inequality, our analysis suggests that, although induced increases in the relative supply of more educated labor may moderate the effect of increased demand for more educated labor, the increases in educational inequality during the 1980s and 1990s are unlikely to be soon reversed.
DeÞnitions and Some Facts
We deÞne educational inequality to be the ratio of the average wage or salary of workers with more years of education to the average wage or salary of workers with fewer years of education.
1 Educational inequality comprises the relative earnings of efficiency units of more and less educated labor and the average abilities of more and less educated workers, measured as the average number of efficiency units of more or less educated labor that a worker supplies.
Looking at workers who have and have not attended college, Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz (2001) found that in the United States educational inequality exhibited a generally Ushaped pattern over the twentieth century. Educational inequality apparently decreased from 1900 until 1950, but then increased from 1950 to the end of the century. Strikingly, Goldin and Katz estimate that "the relative earnings of the more-educated [in 1999 ] are similar to that which prevailed in the early twentieth century."
This U-shaped pattern, however, was not smooth. Looking at the Þrst half of the century, Goldin and Katz found that educational inequality decreased in "two giant steps", one in the years before and after 1920 and the other during the 1940s. Turning to the second half of the century, David Autor, Katz, and Alan Krueger (1998) found that educational inequality increased from 1950 to 1970, but decreased during the 1970s. Autor, Katz, and Krueger also quantiÞed the large and widely discussed increase in educational inequality during the 1980s. Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein, and John Schmitt (2001) Þnd that educational inequality increased further over the 1990s, although at a slower rate than in the 1980s.
As indicated, our analysis addresses how educational inequality is related in the long 1 Some authors refer to educational inequality as "the return to education" or "the education premium".
As deÞned by Peter Gottschalk (1997, page 29) , "The college premium is captured by the coefficient on the dummy college variable in a standard regression explaining (the log of) weekly earnings; essentially, that coefficient shows how much more a college graduate earns than does a high school graduate holding other factors, such as experience, constant."
run to ability premiums. We deÞne ability premiums to be differences between wages and salaries received by workers with the same years of education who are more or less able.
Ability premiums result from the advantage in production associated with being more able, combined with factors that determine differences in ability, such as the innate characteristics of individual workers and the quality of the educations that workers receive.
Analyzing American data from 1963 to 1989 , Chinhui Juhn, Kevin Murphy, and Brooks Pierce (1993 found that the residual inequality in wages or salaries that remains after accounting for years of education and experience increased steadily from the late 1960s through the 1980s. According to Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt (2001) more recent data indicate that residual inequality peaked about 1995 and since then has declined. We can presume that these changes in residual inequality reßect, either wholly or in part, changes in ability premiums.
2 In addition, Richard Murnane, John Willett, and Frank Levy (1995) report that the dependence of wages or salaries on a measure of mathematical skill, which we can take to be a proxy for ability, increased between the 1970s and the 1980s especially for college-educated workers and also for less educated workers. 
Analytical Framework and Related Literature
Our framework for analyzing changes in educational inequality allows for innovations in three structural factors: One factor is the relative demand for more educated labor. In 2 Some authors refer to residual inequality as "within-group inequality". For simplicity, our theoretical analysis abstracts from inequality associated with experience. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) report that their data also show an increase in the relative return to experience.
3 Eric Gould, Omer Moav, and Bruce Weinberg (2000) point out that since the late 1960s inequality among less educated workers has increased as much as inequality among more educated workers. This observation, together with the results of Murnane, Willett, and Levy, suggests that an increased ability premium does not account completely for increased inequality among less educated workers. Appealing to the distinction introduced by Steven Davis and John Haltiwanger (1991) between inequality within plants and inequality among plants, Gould, Moav, and Weinberg associate increased inequality among less educated workers with "increasing variance of technological implementation across industries".
modeling demand we focus on technological innovations that increase the relative importance of more educated labor in production. We could, however, readily generalize the analysis to take into account other factors that can increase the relative demand for more educated labor, such as innovations that increase the relative demand for education-intensive products, such innovations being a possible result of the removal of barriers to international trade.
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The other two structural factors are advantages in production associated with differences in ability and differences in the quality of education that underlie differences in ability.
Positive innovations in either of these factors directly cause increases in ability premiums, and, as we shall see, in the long run also have an indirect effect on educational inequality.
Innovations in any of the three structural factors that drive our analysis can be correlated. Also, as many authors have suggested, these innovations can be a concomitant of technological progress and economic growth. For example, Oded Galor and Moav (2000) analyze a model in which both the relative importance of more educated labor and the advantage associated with high ability depend only on the rate of technological progress. 5 In their analysis the innovations on which we focus are perfectly correlated.
But, in both principle and in practice these innovations can occur independently of technological progress and economic growth and independently of each other. For example, an increase in the relative importance of more educated labor in production could be associated either with an increase or with a decrease in total factor productivity. As another example, 4 Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2001) claim that computer technology, which substitutes for routine tasks and complements problem-solving tasks, alone "explains thirty to forty percent of the observed relative demand shift favoring college versus non-college labor during 1970 to 1998, with the largest impact felt after 1980." Similarly, Robert Baldwin and Glen Cain(1997) claim that technological innovations have been the main force in increasing educational equality, but James Harrigan and Rita Balaban (1999) report that both capital accumulation and a decrease in the price of traded goods also have contributed.
5 Papers that make similar assumptions include Galor and Daniel Tsiddon (1997 ), Francesco Caselli (1999 ), Huw Lloyd-Ellis (1999 , Philippe Aghion, Peter Howitt, and Giovanni Violante (1999) , and Gould, Moav, and Weinberg (2000) .
increases in differences in the quality of education could result either from improvements in higher quality education or, as some people think has been happening, deterioration in lower quality education. Also, from a theoretical perspective we think that distinguishing the effects of these innovations from each other and from the effects of technological progress, as we do in the present paper, provides a useful clariÞcation.
In other related papers Daron Acemoglu (1998 Acemoglu ( , 2000 assumes that the unusually rapidly increases in the relative number of more educated workers in the 1910s and 1920s and again in the 1970s induced the development of more education-intensive production technologies.
He suggests that in subsequent decades the resulting endogenous response of demand for more educated labor was more than sufficient to reverse the initial decrease in educational inequality. The analysis in the present paper is complementary in that it treats the relative demand for more educated labor as exogenous and the relative supply of more educated labor as endogenous. Together Acemoglu's analysis and the present analysis imply that either an exogenous increase in the relative number of more educated workers or an exogenous increase in the relative demand for more educated labor could lead to an endogenous cycle in educational inequality. But, our analysis also shows that increases in ability premiums dampen the long-run response of the relative supply of more educated workers that otherwise would reverse previous increases in educational inequality.
Educational Inequality in the Short Run
Assume that more educated labor and less educated labor perform complementary functions in the production process. SpeciÞcally, assume that the output per period of a representative Þrm in a representative industry, denoted by Y, is a Cobb-Douglas function of inputs of more educated labor and less educated labor, as in
where L m and L`denote the numbers of efficiency units of more educated labor and less educated labor that the Þrm employs per period. This formulation implies that more educated labor and less educated labor differ qualitatively. The parameter σ measures the relative importance of more educated labor in production.
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LetL m andL`denote the quantities supplied per Þrm per period of efficiency units of more educated labor and less educated labor, and let w m and w`represent the earnings per period of an efficiency unit of more educated labor and less educated labor. Assume that the Þrm takes the earnings of an efficiency unit of labor as given and demands quantities of each type of labor such that the marginal product of an efficiency unit of labor equals the earnings of an efficiency unit of labor. Calculating marginal products from equation (1), and using the market-clearing conditions thatL m equals L m andL`equals L`, we Þnd that
Equation (2) shows that the relative earnings per period of efficiency units of more and less educated labor depend negatively on the relative supply of more educated labor and positively on the relative importance of more educated labor in production.
A worker's wage or salary equals the product of the number of efficiency units of labor that he (or she) supplies per period and the earnings per period of an efficiency unit of his type of labor. We assume that all more educated workers perform the same function in the production process, and that all less educated workers perform the same complementary function in the production process. But, the number of efficiency units of labor that a worker 6 The Cobb-Douglas function in equation (1) is a special case of an aggregate production function that exhibits constant elasticity of substitution between more educated labor and less educated labor, as in (1) obtains in the limit as the parameter ρ goes to zero. If we were to replace equation (1) with the general CES function, then we would have to replace subsequent equations that are derived using equation (1) with more complicated equations involving ρ. These equations are given in the mathematical appendix. As we can see, as long as ρ is not a large negative number, none of our qualitative conclusions, which we draw mainly from equations (11) and (13), are changed. Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) cite various estimates of the elasticity of substitution between workers who are or are not college educated, all of which imply that ρ is in the neighborhood of 1/3.
supplies per period depends on his ability. In other words, differences in ability result in quantitative differences among more educated workers and among less educated workers.
We assume that workers' abilities are coarsely discernable. SpeciÞcally, both a worker and his potential employers can discern only whether a worker has high ability, or ordinary ability, or low ability. 7 Low ability can be either innate or a result of the quality of the basic education that a worker receives. Ordinary ability or high ability can be either innate or a result of a combination of the quality of the basic education that a worker receives and the quality of the advanced education that is available to a worker.
We also assume that a worker's ability affects his potential for educational achievement in the following ways: (1) Workers with either high ability or ordinary ability are capable of becoming more educated. (2) Workers with high ability can realize their productive advantage over workers with ordinary ability only by becoming more educated. (3) Workers with low ability are not educable beyond a basic education.
Abstracting from differences in experience, let those more educated workers discerned to have high ability on average supply α efficiency units of labor per period and let those more educated workers discerned to have ordinary ability on average supply β efficiency units of labor per period, where β < α. Accordingly, we have W mh = αw m and W mo = βw m , where W mh denotes the wage or salary of a more educated worker with high ability, and W mo denotes the wage or salary of a more educated worker with ordinary ability. The ratio W mh /W mo , which equals the ratio α/β, measures the ability premium for more educated workers.
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7 None of the main qualitative results of the analysis would change if workers' abilities were discernable, somewhat less coarsely, into a larger, but Þnite, number of ability levels. The more elegant alternative of assuming that workers' abilities are Þnely discernable along a continuum seems unrealistic.
8 Because more educated workers are discerned to have either high ability or ordinary ability and less educated workers are discerned to have either ordinary ability or low ability, ability premiums do not depend on the numbers of more or less educated workers. If workers' abilities were more Þnely discernable, then an
Similarly, let those less educated workers discerned to have ordinary ability on average supply γ efficiency units of labor per period and let those less educated workers discerned to have low ability on average supply δ efficiency units of labor per period, where δ < γ.
Thus, we have W`o = γw`, and W``= δw`, where W`o denotes the wage or salary of a less educated worker with ordinary ability, and W``denotes the wage or salary of a less educated worker with low ability. The ratio W`o/W``, which equals the ratio γ/δ, measures the ability premium for less educated workers.
Let N mh denote the number of more educated workers who have high ability, and let N mo denote the number of more educated workers who have ordinary ability. Also, let N`o denote the number of less educated workers who have ordinary ability, and let N``denote the number of less educated workers who have low ability. We deÞne the short run to be an interval over which all of these numbers are predetermined. Given α, β, γ, and δ, the relative supply of efficiency units of more educated labor is related to the numbers of workers of each type according to
Let W m denote the average wage or salary per period of more educated workers, and let W`denote the average wage or salary per period of less educated workers. To calculate W m we divide the aggregate earnings per period of more educated workers, (αN mh + βN mo )w m , by the number of more educated workers, N mh + N mo . To calculate W`we divide the aggregate earnings per period of less educated workers, (γN`o + δN``)w`, by the number of less educated workers, N`o + N``. Alternatively, we can characterize W m as the product increase in the fraction of workers who choose to become more educated could cause an increase in the ratio of the wage or salary of the most able more educated worker to the wage or salary of the least able more educated worker and a decrease in the ratio of the wage or salary of the most able less educated worker to the wage or salary of the least able less educated worker. If ability premiums were deÞned as these ratios, then ability premiums would depend on the identities of the least able more educated worker and the most able less educated worker, hence, on the numbers of more or less educated workers.
of the earnings of an efficiency unit of more educated labor, w m , and the average ability of more educated workers, (αN mh + βN mo )/(N mh + N mo ), and similarly for W`.
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The ratio W m /W`measures educational inequality. Calculating W m and W`and dividing we obtain
Equation (4) shows how educational inequality comprises the relative earnings per period of efficiency units of more and less educated labor and the average abilities of more and less educated workers.
Substituting equations (2) and (3), which determine the ratio w m /w`, into equation (4),
Equation (5) implies that educational inequality depends positively on the number of less educated workers relative to the number of more educated workers. Robert Topel (1997) reports that the data for many countries are consistent with this implication. In addition, equation (5) implies that, given the relative number of more educated workers, a technological innovation that increases the parameter σ, the relative importance of more educated labor, increases educational inequality.
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9 These calculations correspond to the standard way of calculating the average wage or salary of more and less educated workers from panel data. For more detailed explanations, see Katz and Murphy (1992) and Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt (2001) .
10 According to equation (5), given the relative number of more educated workers, educational inequality does not depend on α, β, γ, or δ. An innovation that increases either α or β would increase the average wage or salary of a more educated worker for given earnings per efficiency unit of more educated labor. But, an increased supply of efficiency units of more educated labor also would decrease the relative earnings per efficiency unit of more educated labor. With a Cobb-Douglas production function these two effects on educational inequality are exactly offsetting. Accordingly, the Cobb-Douglas production function
The Long Run
The relative number of more educated workers is predetermined only in the short run.
In the long run the fraction of workers that chooses to become more educated responds both to innovations that increase the relative demand for more educated labor and to innovations that increase ability premiums. To facilitate the analysis we deÞne the long run to be a steady state in which the fractions of workers with high ability and with ordinary ability that choose to become more educated are the same in every age cohort and in which these fractions are such that the lifetime earnings of more educated workers and comparable less educated workers are equal. This deÞnition implies that a worker chooses to become more educated or to remain less educated according to which choice yields him higher lifetime earnings.
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Realization of a new long run in which a larger fraction of workers in every age cohort chooses to become more educated would require that the structural parameters remain unchanged for as long as it takes for the educational sector to expand to accommodate the required larger fraction of each age cohort and, once the educational sector has expanded appropriately, for long enough for an age cohort to pass completely through a life cycle.
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Thus, in practice, the long run only speciÞes a value to which at any point in time the enables us to isolate how innovations that increase ability premiums, by affecting the relative supply of more educated labor, inßuence educational inequality in the long run. With the general CES production function educational inequality in the short run would be either positively or negatively related to both α and β as ρ is positive or negative. A similar analysis applies to γ and δ. See the mathematical appendix.
11 Our analysis abstracts from liquidity constraints on the ability to Þnance education. Galor and Moav (2000) point out that, if technological progress relaxes liquidity constraints on the ability to Þnance education, then technological progress can be associated with a decrease in educational inequality. Gould, Moav, and Weinberg (2000) introduce an additional precautionary motive for becoming more educated.
12 An increasing fraction of more educated workers and an expanding educational sector is historically relevant. The hypothetical realization of a new long run with a smaller fraction of more educated workers and a smaller educational sector presumably would involve a different dynamic process.
fractions of more educated workers and less educated workers are tending. Nevertheless, by focusing on the properties of the long run we can see most simply and clearly how endogeneity of the relative supply of more educated labor affects educational inequality.
To analyze educational inequality in the long run, consider a constant population of workers per Þrm, normalized to one, with constant fractions of workers that have high ability, ordinary ability, and low ability. Let H, O, and L, respectively, denote these fractions, where H + O + L = 1. Recall that workers with high ability can realize their advantage over workers with ordinary ability only by becoming more educated and that workers with low ability are not educable beyond a basic education.
Let M denote the fraction of workers with ordinary ability that chooses to become more educated. The fraction 1 − M remains less educated. For ability premiums to be observed both for more educated workers and for less educated workers, both M and 1−M must be positive. Hence, in the long run workers with ordinary ability must be indifferent between becoming more educated and remaining less educated. Moreover, if some workers with ordinary ability choose to become more educated, then all workers with high ability choose to become more educated.
Assume that each worker is active for T periods and that to become more educated a worker must spend τ periods in school rather than in the work force, where τ < T. Thus, in the long run Hτ /T young workers who have high ability and OM * τ /T young workers who have ordinary ability are in school, where the * denotes a value that obtains in the long run. Accordingly, in the long run the number of workers of each type who are in the work force is
and
Substituting equations (6) into equation (5) we obtain
Equation (7) relates educational inequality in the long run to the fractions of the workers who have high, ordinary, or low ability, the fraction of workers with ordinary ability that chooses to become more educated, the fraction of his active life that a more educated worker spends in the work force, and the relative importance of more educated labor in production.
The Choice to become More Educated
To determine the fraction of workers with ordinary ability that chooses to become more educated, let E * mo denote the lifetime earnings of a more educated worker with ordinary ability in the long run, and let E * o denote the lifetime earnings of a less educated worker with ordinary ability in the long run. Given T and τ, we have
In this formulation the cost of becoming more educated equals the earnings foregone while becoming more educated.
As we have noted, for ability premiums to be observed both for more educated workers and for less educated workers, workers with ordinary ability must be indifferent between becoming more educated and remaining less educated. This property of indifference implies that E * mo must equal E * o . Equating E * mo and E * o we Þnd that in the long run the fraction of the workers with ordinary ability that chooses to become more educated is such that earnings per efficiency unit of more educated labor relative to earnings per efficiency unit of less educated labor satisÞes
According to equation (9) w * m /w * does not depend on σ. Thus, equation (9) has the following implication:
In response to an innovation that increases the relative importance of more educated labor, in the long run an increase in the fraction of workers with ordinary ability that chooses to become more educated reverses the short-run increase in earnings per efficiency unit of more educated labor relative to earnings per efficiency unit of less educated labor.
To analyze educational inequality we have to use this implication about the relative earnings per efficiency unit to help us to determine the fraction of workers with ordinary ability that chooses to become more educated.
Earnings per efficiency unit of more educated labor and less educated labor also must satisfy market-clearing conditions. Substituting equation (3) into equation (2), and using equation (6), we Þnd that market clearing implies that
Solving equations (9) and (10) for M * , we obtain
We assume that the values of the parameters are such that M * , as given by equation (11), is a positive fraction. Equation (11) shows that M * is not only positively related to σ, an effect that already was implicit in equation (9), but that M * is also negatively related to the ratios α/β and γ/δ.
This important result obtains because ability premiums affect the average wage or salary of more educated workers with ordinary ability relative to the average wage or salary of less educated workers with ordinary ability. SpeciÞcally, we can understand why M * depends negatively on α/β as follows: (An analogous explanation applies to γ/δ.) Given N * mo and N * o , the larger is α the larger would be the relative supply of more educated labor and, hence, from equation (10), the smaller would be the ratio βw * m /γw * that satisÞes the market-clearing conditions. But, the ratio βw * m /γw * also must satisfy the equality
, and the implied equation (9), which does not involve α. Consequently, equation (10) Also, given N * mo and N * o , the smaller is β the smaller is the relative supply of more educated labor. But, given w * m , the smaller is β the smaller is βw * m . It is easy to see that, with a Cobb-Douglas production function, the latter effect dominates. Consequently, to satisfy the equality E * o = E * mo , the smaller is β again the smaller must be M * .
In addition, with a Cobb-Douglas production function, the effects of α and 1/β on M * are equal, as are the effects of γ and 1/δ. 13 To see these results algebraically, observe that, after multiplying by β/γ, equation (10) becomes
Equation (12) implies that, ceteris paribus, the larger is either α/β or γ/δ the smaller is the average wage or salary of a more educated worker with ordinary ability relative to the average wage or salary of a less educated worker with ordinary ability, W * mo /W * o , for any given value of M * . Thus, to satisfy the equality E * o = E * mo and equation (9), the larger is either α/β or γ/δ the smaller must be M * .
In sum, equation (11) has the following implication:
Whereas innovations that increase the relative importance of more educated labor cause a larger fraction of the workers with ordinary ability to choose to become 13 With the general CES production function M * would be either more or less sensitive to 1/β than to α as ρ is positive or negative. But, as long as ρ is not a large negative number, M * still would be negatively related to both α and 1/β. The same effect would carry over to the relation between W more educated, innovations that increase ability premiums cause a smaller fraction of workers with ordinary ability to choose to become more educated.
The net change in the fraction of workers that chooses to become more educated depends on the net effect of innovations that increase the relative importance of more educated labor and innovations that increase ability premiums.
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Educational Inequality in the Long Run
Substituting equation (11) into equation (7) we obtain a solution for educational inequality in the long run, W * m /W * , as a function of the exogenous variables,
Given that α is larger than β and that γ is larger than δ, equation (13) implies that W * m /W * is smaller the larger is σ. In the limit as the ratios α/β and γ/δ approach one, W * m /W * becomes independent of σ. Thus, equation (13) has the following implication:
If and only if ability premiums exist, an innovation that increases educational inequality in the short run causes a decrease in educational inequality in the long run.
14 Equation (11) also tells us that M * does not depend on either T or τ. This result obtains because the larger is T/(T − τ ) the larger is E * mo relative to E * o for a given ratio W * mo /W * o , but also the smaller is the ratio W * mo /W * o that satisÞes market-clearing conditions. Given the assumed Cobb-Douglas production function, these two effects are offsetting. Hence, the value of M * that satisÞes the equality Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Harl Ryder, and David Weil (2000) for a model in which the longer that a worker expects to live the larger is the number of years of schooling that he chooses.
in σ in the long run causes sufficiently more workers with ordinary ability to become more educated to offset the short-run effect of σ on the relative earnings per efficiency unit of more educated labor. The addition of more workers with ordinary ability to the total number of more educated workers also decreases the average number of efficiency units of more educated labor that more educated workers supply and increases the average number of efficiency units of less educated labor that less educated workers supply. The result is that w * m /w * is unchanged and that W * m /W * is decreased. Equation (13) also implies that W * m /W * is larger the larger are the ratios α/β and γ/δ. Thus, equation (13) also has the following implication:
Innovations that increase ability premiums cause educational inequality in the long run to be larger than it otherwise would be.
This result obtains because, as we have seen from equation (11), an increase in either α/β or γ/δ causes a decrease in M * .
From equation (13) we also see that W * m /W * is larger the larger is T/(T − τ ). The effect of T/(T − τ ) on educational inequality obtains because, from equation (7), for any value of M * , the smaller is the fraction of his active life that a more educated worker spends in the work force the smaller is the relative supply of more educated labor, and the larger is
The Observed Pattern of Educational Inequality
Over the past few centuries life expectancy at all ages has steadily increased. A concomitant of this steady increase in life expectancy has been a steady increase in the fraction of his active life that a more educated worker can spend in the work force. In terms of our model, there has been a secular increase in (T − τ )/T. Equation (13) implies that the secular increase in the relative supply of more educated labor resulting from the secular increase in (T − τ )/T tends to decrease educational inequality. Goldin and Katz (2001) suggest that over the Þrst half of the twentieth century the increased relative supply of more educated labor seems to have been the dominant inßuence on educational inequality, despite technological innovations that increased the relative importance of more educated labor in production.
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Now, suppose that during 1950s and 1960s and again during the 1980s and 1990s innovations that increased the relative demand for more educated labor were large enough to outweigh the effect of continuing increases in the relative supply of more educated labor. In our analysis we have modeled innovations that increased the relative demand for more educated labor by increases in σ. These innovations could account for the observed deviations during these decades from the secular trend of decreasing educational inequality.
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Our analysis implies, however, that increases in σ do not cause permanent increases in educational inequality. On the contrary, our analysis implies that an induced long-run increase in the relative supply of more educated labor more than reverses any short-run increase in educational inequality caused by an increase in σ. Thus, our model predicts that, to the extent that an increase in educational inequality reßects the short-run effect of an increase in σ, educational inequality will tend to return to its long-run downward trend.
We might speculate that the slowing of the rate of increase in educational inequality in the 1990s compared to the 1980s indicates the beginning of this process.
But, our analysis also suggests that there is more to the story than increases in the relative demand for more educated labor. As we have noted, the data tell us that ability premiums 15 Although not formally included in our model, expansion of publicly-Þnanced higher education, which steadily decreased the out-of-pocket cost of becoming more educated, was another factor that caused an increase in the supply of more educated labor from the middle of the nineteenth century until at least the middle of the twentieth century.
16 Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998) speculate that a temporary slowing in the rate of increase in the relative supply of more educated labor, resulting from exogenous demographic factors, also contributed to the increases in educational inequality during the 1980s and 1990s.
increased steadily from the late 1960s until the mid 1990s. We suggested that these increases in ability premiums resulted from a combination of increases in the advantage in production associated with being more able and increased differences in the quality of education. In our model ability premiums affect the average wage or salary of a more educated worker with ordinary ability relative to the average wage or salary of a less educated worker with ordinary ability. This effect has the critical implication that increases in ability premiums cause a smaller fraction of workers with ordinary ability to choose to become more educated. Hence, in the long run increases in ability premiums cause educational inequality to be larger.
This implication suggests an additional reason for the increase in educational inequality during the 1980s and 1990s. More importantly, to the extent that increases in ability premiums are contributing in the long run to educational inequality, the theory implies that, although induced increases in the relative supply of more educated labor may moderate educational inequality, the increases in educational inequality during the 1980s and 1990s are unlikely to be soon reversed.
Summary
This paper has developed a theoretical model that relates changes in educational inequality to the combined effects of innovations that have increased the relative demand for more educated labor and innovations that have increased ability premiums. In the short run, in which the number of more educated workers is given, an increase in the relative demand for more educated labor causes an increase in educational inequality. In the long run, however, an increase in the relative demand for more educated labor causes a larger fraction of workers to choose to become more educated. Our analysis implies that, given that ability premiums exist, the induced long-run increase in the relative supply of more educated labor by itself would be large enough more than to reverse the short-run increase in educational inequality.
But, our analysis also implies that educational inequality is positively related to ability premiums. Most interestingly, the larger are ability premiums the smaller is the fraction of workers that must choose to become more educated in order to equalize the lifetime earnings of more educated workers and comparable less educated workers. Consequently, in the long run innovations that cause increases in ability premiums also cause the relative supply of more educated labor to be smaller than otherwise and cause educational inequality to be larger than otherwise. In applying our theory to recent changes in educational inequality in the United States, we suggest that increases in ability premiums have dampened the longrun response of the relative supply of more educated workers that otherwise would reverse previous increases in educational inequality.
